Remarks by Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
at the European Policy Center

Brussels, 23 March 2001

I have been asked to address the question: “Will ASEAN be like the EU?”

This question reminds me of the statement that one of Southeast Asia’s leading intellectuals, Dr. Noordin Sopiee, made not so long ago. He said that ASEAN suffers from a severe problem, and that is the problem of always being compared to the European Union, being always measured against the standards of the EU.

This is both flattering and troubling.

It is flattering, because it indicates that ASEAN has gone so far as a regional association that it is possible to compare it to the EU and judge it by EU norms. At the same time, it is troubling, because it raises expectations to unattainable heights. People tend to expect ASEAN to do what it cannot do and what it was never meant to do. In the process, they tend to lose sight of what ASEAN has done and what it can do.

I will, even now, give my answer to the question that this discussion asks. My answer is that ASEAN will never be like the EU, but within the parameters of the realities of the region, the circumstances of the association’s origins, its present condition, and its likely situation in the future, it will be doing more and more of the things that the EU has done to promote peace, economic integration and growth, social development, and general human welfare - in different ways, at a different pace, but in the same general direction.

The question “Will ASEAN be like the EU?” is like the one that Professor Higgins asks in My Fair Lady: “Why can’t a woman be more like a man?” -- a plaintive question uttered in extreme frustration.

To ask such a question of ASEAN and the EU is similarly futile and could be frustrating. In many ways, ASEAN is not like the EU, probably never will be, as women will always be different, in many ways, from men.

We all know the forces that impelled the EU’s formation and shaped its character. We all know the historical, cultural and ideological foundations that have made it possible for the EU to take the shape and direction that it has. It is these unique forces, circumstances and foundations that have made the EU unique. The EU Web site forthrightly states: “The European Union is built on an institutional system which is the only one of its kind in the world.”

ASEAN, on the other hand, is like most other regional associations in the world. It is a voluntary association of sovereign states that do not yield their sovereignty to a central authority. It has no parliament, no court of justice, no court of auditors. It has no common currency, no central monetary authority. It has no common set of external tariffs or trade policies and regulations. Each member, and not the association as a whole, negotiates trade agreements with other countries. Its citizens do not move freely within the region. Its secretariat is no European Commission, having no supranational authority or responsibility. It is certainly smaller, its budget and personnel complement a tiny fraction of those of the Commission.

And yet ASEAN has gone so far ahead of many other regional associations that, as I stated earlier, it is now, somewhat impatiently, being compared with the EU itself.

For all practical purposes, ASEAN is now a free trade area, or very close to becoming one. In less than a year, tariffs on practically all goods traded in ASEAN will be down to five percent or less or none at all. Efforts to liberalize intra-ASEAN trade in services are underway. Tariff nomenclatures and product standards are being harmonized to make trade easier. ASEAN is cooperating to streamline customs procedures and transport regimes. Negotiations have started on liberalizing intra-regional trade in services. Investment flows within and into ASEAN are being freed up. Work is being done to link all the countries of mainland Southeast Asia - and southern China -- through a railway network, a highway system that will ultimately cover more than 33,000 kilometers, and improved navigation on the Mekong River. Plans are being laid for an integrated power grid and a network of gas pipelines to provide energy security for all. All this is being done to promote trade, stimulate economic activity, draw in investments, and improve people’s lives.

Partly as a response to the financial crisis of 1997-1998, ASEAN has stepped up cooperation in financial matters. This is being done primarily through a surveillance and peer review process, in which the finance ministers collectively monitor economic developments and financial movements in the region and encourage one another in national reform and regional cooperative measures. The ASEAN currency swap arrangement has been expanded and enlarged, and it is being strengthened by a network of bilateral currency swap and repurchase agreements with China, Japan and Korea.

ASEAN has recognized the importance of information and communications technology in today’s economy, and it is determined to harness the power of ICT through the e-ASEAN initiative. The initiative seeks to promote the development of the necessary infrastructure, largely by encouraging the private sector. It aims to lay down the legal and policy environment for e-commerce. It is committed to liberalizing trade and investments in ICT goods and services. It encompasses the building of institutions and the development of the required human resources.

With the help of the EU, the Asian Development Bank and other countries and institutions, ASEAN has dealt cooperatively with the problem of haze pollution arising from land and forest fires in parts of the region. It has closely cooperated in steps to conserve biodiversity. It is working jointly to foster public education on the value of protecting the environment and on how to bring it about.

ASEAN cooperates closely in the surveillance of contagious diseases, in the control and prevention of HIV/AIDS, in the fight against drug-trafficking and drug-addiction, in safety and health in the workplace. Its decisions on these areas are not legally binding, but they are a matter of public commitment by their governments, and that is good enough for ASEAN for now.

The areas of such cooperation have rapidly increased in recent years. The resulting network of official and personal interaction among ASEAN’s governments, business communities and other sectors - at various levels and in various fields -- has strengthened the sense of community in the region despite the relative paucity of formal institutions and legal instruments, so that today conflict between ASEAN members is all but unthinkable.

Last month, I pointed out at a meeting of regional associations with the United Nations Secretary-General in New York:

“This singular achievement (the absence of inter-state conflict in ASEAN) may be attributed to ASEAN’s approach to the conduct of relations among members, to the very character of the association. In its approach to common goals and to issues that could lead to conflict, ASEAN places a premium on dialogue and consultation in place of posturing and confrontation. It prefers quiet discussions and eschews ‘megaphone diplomacy’ and ‘feel-good diplomacy.’ It considers mutual respect and understanding - understanding by each member of another’s situation and difficulties - as vital to the peace and stability of the region and to the future of the association itself.

“In ASEAN, bilateral issues - whether they have to do with boundaries, borders or the movement of people - are managed bilaterally, without being complicated by unnecessary regionalization or internationalization. As in the case of many other regional organizations, ASEAN’s insistence on consensus ensures that the association takes no action that threatens the vital interests of any member.

“The very process of integrating the ASEAN economy, aimed primarily at productive efficiency, easier and less costly commerce, increased investments and the generation of jobs, serves to strengthen the fabric of peace by raising the stake of each ASEAN member in the prosperity of all.”

Yet, it is important to remember in all this that ASEAN remains a region of great diversity - in size, levels of development, natural and human resources, histories, cultures, languages, religions, races, economic and social institutions, political systems, and values and traditions. This diversity is certainly greater than that of Europe or Latin America and has, in fact, been increased by ASEAN’s recent enlargement.

As I stressed in a lecture in Australia more than two years ago, “ASEAN, therefore, must carefully nurture its cohesion. Its institutions and processes must be allowed to evolve slowly. The pace of that evolution cannot be forced. It is for good historical, cultural and political reasons . . . that ASEAN has so far leaned toward informal understandings and voluntary arrangements rather than toward legally binding agreements. They are also why the building of formal ASEAN institutions has been slow and gradual.”

We need only to recall that it was not until 1976, almost nine years after the association’s founding, that ASEAN held its first summit meeting. It was only then that ASEAN concluded its first binding agreement, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which serves as a code of behavior for the parties to the treaty, commits them to the peaceful settlement of disputes and provides a mechanism for settling disputes. The treaty has never been invoked, but it is there. It was also at that summit that a small secretariat was established. Today, ASEAN’s leaders meet at least once a year.

It was not until 1992 that a formal agreement bound the ASEAN countries to create a free trade area, the timetable for which has been accelerated a number of times. A similar agreement, on the free flow of investments within and into ASEAN, was concluded in 1998. These and all other ASEAN economic agreements are governed by a dispute-settlement process.

ASEAN’s leaders signed the treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in 1995 as ASEAN’s contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the security of the region. It is now consulting with the five nuclear-weapon states on the protocol by which those states can accede to the treaty.

Nevertheless, most of ASEAN’s processes remain informal, most of its understandings non-binding in a legal sense. Given the circumstances, it is the only realistic way to go for now in most cases.

For example, ASEAN as a group is now holding discussions with China on a code of conduct for the South China Sea, but such a code will be a declaration of political intent rather than a legally binding instrument.

ASEAN’s military chiefs meet socially and informally. ASEAN countries exchange students in their military academies. But, of course, ASEAN is no military alliance. It does not embark on peacekeeping operations. It has no armed forces at its disposal, does not undertake joint military exercises or joint military planning. It has no common foreign and security policy.

ASEAN took the lead in the settlement of the Cambodian conflict in the early 1990s. It had a prominent role in the International Force for East Timor and is active in the UN Transitional Authority for East Timor, including its peacekeeping and security forces. But in both Cambodia and East Timor ASEAN military participation has consisted of voluntary contributions by individual members within the framework of UN actions.

ASEAN initiated the ASEAN Regional Forum seven years ago to engage the major powers and others with interests in the region, including the European Union, in consultations and dialogue on political and security issues affecting the Asia-Pacific. The latest participant is North Korea. ARF is obviously not a military alliance and cannot be one. It is not even anywhere near the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. But ARF seeks to build mutual confidence through regular consultations and joint activities and develop a capacity to prevent conflicts through diplomacy. The possibility of engaging in conflict-settlement is under study and will probably remain there for some time.

Meanwhile, ARF measures for building confidence, such as the publication of defense white papers, a regional registry of conventional arms, joint training in disaster relief, in de-mining, and in search and rescue, exchanges between defense colleges, and visits by high-ranking defense and military officials, help to strengthen security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. ARF meetings also afford opportunities for bilateral or plurilateral contacts among members on live political and security questions.

It is clear from all this that ASEAN falls short of where the EU is today. However, it is equally clear that ASEAN is moving, as it must, toward closer economic integration and tighter, firmer, more institutionalized collaboration on a growing host of transnational issues that beset the region as a whole. The pressures of globalization, the forces of technology, the growing interdependence of economies, the heightened competition for markets and investments, and the increasing severity of transnational problems demand it.

Now that the ASEAN Free Trade Area is about to become reality, the question is being asked: After AFTA, what? There is some unofficial talk of forming a customs union provided the technical problems can be overcome. The integration of markets for services, in all their complication, is under serious discussion. It is no longer unthinkable to talk about a common currency, although it is still limited to academic circles and officials speaking in their personal capacity. Short of that, some degree of monetary policy coordination may be desirable. ASEAN’s leaders have already called for the greater use of regional currencies for the settlement of trade between ASEAN members.

ASEAN is now working on a possible agreement on preventing and controlling the haze pollution that has caused so much damage to parts of Southeast Asia in recent years. Similar formal agreements could be forged on other areas of the environment.

Common regulations may be agreed upon with respect to various forms of transportation, professional accreditation, and the treatment of food, medicine and chemicals that are traded across national boundaries. In all this, ASEAN can learn much from the experience of the EU - perhaps not where the EU is today but at earlier stages of its evolution.

Eventually, ASEAN may develop agreed norms of governance, as the EU and several other inter-state associations have done.

Will ASEAN be like the EU? Most likely not. At least not exactly. As the EU itself acknowledges, it is unique as a regional organization and will probably remain so. But we can expect domestic and external forces, the logic of globalization, and the imperatives of regionalism to move ASEAN to resemble the EU more closely than it does today, and as ASEAN evolves, more closely than we can foresee today.