Conflict Prevention and Peace-building in Southeast Asia

Regional Mechanisms, Best Practices and ASEAN-UN Cooperation in the 21^st Century

Executive Summary

Background

The United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines (DFA), the ASEAN Secretariat, and the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. (ISDS) agreed to hold the Manila Seminar on “Conflict Prevention and Peace-building in Southeast Asia: Regional Mechanisms, Best Practices and ASEAN-UN Cooperation in the 21^st Century” on 19-22 February 2002. It is the second in a series of collaborative activities between the UNDPA and the UNDP on the one hand, and the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS), on the other. The first seminar was co-organized with the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University (ISIS Thailand) in January 2001 on “Democratization and Conflict Management/Prevention in Southeast Asia in the 21^st Century”.

1. to draw lessons and best practices from the ASEAN region’s experiences in conflict prevention and crisis management,

2. to identify key issues and areas that may benefit an invigorated preventive and post-conflict action agenda, as well as possible ways of enhancing the region’s capacity for conflict prevention,

3. to explore ways, modalities and arrangements to strengthen ASEAN-UN cooperation in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building, and

It was agreed that recognized experts from government, the academe, regional and international organizations, and civil society would be invited to the Manila Seminar.

The Manila Seminar’s paper presenters and discussants were drawn mainly from ASEAN ISIS and resource persons recommended by the regional offices of UNDP. The final list of 41 participants[1] included those from the 10 ASEAN member countries, the ASEAN Secretariat, UNDP, UNDPA, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, and ISDS. In addition two observers came from the PARAGON and the International Peace Academy who covered their own costs. The participants were invited in their personal capacity in accordance with the usual practice of track two meetings, although the Manila Seminar in the end operated as a “track one and a half” forum.

In general, the Manila Seminar provided a venue for an in-depth and rich discussion of the various experiences in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace-building in the ASEAN region. It was able to identify both the successful and failed experiences of the region in these tasks and areas needing the attention of stakeholders and assistance of partners, as well as make both short-term and long-term policy recommendations for the consideration of ASEAN and the UN.

There were nine paper presentations focusing on regional mechanism for conflict prevention, 5 case studies in conflict prevention and peace-building in the region (Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Myanmar, and the South China Sea Disputes), best practices and lessons learned from these regional experiences (including in Mindanao) and how they can be helpful in building regional capacity for dealing with future crises, and how to enhance ASEAN-UN cooperation in these tasks in the 21^st century. As shown below, through these presentations and the ensuing discussions, the four objectives of the seminar were achieved.

While ASEAN was not intended as a mechanism for conflict prevention and peace-building, its record indicates that its norms, principles, and processes, known collectively as the “ASEAN Way” have contributed to peace and stability in a region fraught with bilateral tension and domestic threats to peace and stability at the time of ASEAN’s establishment. For over 30 years, while ASEAN did not directly remove or resolve the causes of these tensions, it succeeded in avoiding their eruption into open conflict and its original members succeeded either in resolving or moderating domestic threats to peace and stability. However, to remain relevant, it needs to re-examine itself in the light of a constantly changing environment.

The case studies provided important lessons that can be useful in increasing the region’s capacity for conflict prevention and peace-building in the future as well as in enhancing ASEAN-UN cooperation in undertaking these tasks in this century.

Sustained Engagement of the International Community in Peace-building - The Cambodian case showed that while success was achieved in putting democratic structures in place in which the rival political factions were represented, it is also necessary for the engagement of the international community in peace-building in post-conflict to remain on a sustained basis, if long-term peace is to be achieved. The events of July 1997 pointed to this lesson. Moreover, there are still many unfinished tasks in Cambodia, such as in the area of human rights training and demobilization, among others. Here, the positive role of the international community was highlighted with UNTAET’s (UN Transitional Authority in East Timor) pivotal role in the democratization process and in peace-building, including in the reintegration of former combatants into East Timor society. The UN has learned the lesson in Cambodia and intends to remain engaged in peace-building in post-conflict East Timor.

Agreement by the concerned state to international action - In East Timor, the involvement of the international community was facilitated by the willingness of the Indonesian government “to be helped.” Nevertheless, the non-interference principle as a cardinal norm in ASEAN limited its capacity to deal with domestic conflicts.

The UN as facilitator with the agreement of the state concerned and the support of the international community - In the case of Myanmar, the UN’s role is as facilitator. In this regard, it needs the agreement of the government and the support of the international community if change is to be effected. Incremental steps have been taken such as the work of the ILO (International Labor Organization) in promoting labor standards and on the part of the government with its initiative to foster confidence building with the NLD (National League of Democracy). Frank exchanges of perspectives took place during the discussions, providing a balanced picture of the status of conflict prevention and peace-building as well as the process of change in Myanmar. It is apparent that there are still formidable challenges facing Myanmar, including the need to normalize its political processes to foster political stability and to move forward crucial social reforms especially in the field of education.

Inclusive political participation and better governance - In Indonesia, the outbreak of ethnic conflict and violence was largely due to the collapse of state authority. It was emphasized that decision-making must include the participation of all ethnic groups to ensure a more equitable redistribution of resources that can help reduce ethnic conflict. Institutional reforms in governance such as decentralization and autonomy for the local governments would go long way in addressing the problem of ethnic strife in Indonesia. The participatory approach used by ASEAN and the UN in the democratization of Cambodia also led to its success.

Conflict as opportunity for cooperation - On the South China Sea dispute, potential irritants still persist in spite of bilateral and multilateral dialogues and the adoption of codes of conduct. The disputes persist in part due to the lack of common ground on how to proceed among the claimants. While preventing the symptoms of conflict is important, it is also necessary to transform them into opportunities for cooperation. One way to do this is by looking at fundamental needs and fears that are considered non-negotiable by the parties and using them as windows of opportunities for cooperation among them.

Third party mediation - In Mindanao, the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) and Indonesia helped forge a peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) separatist group. However, though the peace agreement is in place, a new paradigm must be used to address deep-seated cleavages. Peace must be based on economic development, social capital building and social cohesion. But the real test of a lasting peace is the equitable distribution of the fruits of development among the ethnic groups in Mindanao.

Exercise of political will - The region’s experiences also showed that conflict prevention and peace building are not solely dependent on the international community but also on the determination of national leaders. The political will of leaders to achieve peace and development is a necessary condition that would allow the international community to provide assistance.

Post-conflict community capacity building - A peace agreement is only one of the first steps in peace-building. The agreement includes reconstruction and rehabilitation, as well as social capital building among communities with a low level of social cohesion. The capacity of communities to identify and develop mediators to facilitate the conduct of dialogues between and among stakeholders must also be built.

Use of a holistic strategy – Combined with inclusive participation, the strategy employed that led to success in conflict prevention and peace-building in Southeast Asia is holistic where the country’s social, economic, political and other conditions were taken into account in crafting an appropriate peace-building agenda, such as in Cambodia.

Perceived Weaknesses of Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention and Peace-building

Guided by these observations, the participants noted that existing regional mechanisms in ASEAN seem inadequate to respond to regional conflicts and saw the need to explore and establish an appropriate ASEAN-UN cooperative framework in conflict prevention and peace-building.

Though there had been ASEAN-UN cooperation in the past, the participants emphasized the need to explore new and expand possible areas of cooperation between them. Some of them are:

2. definition of the political objectives of ASEAN and the UN in the case in which they cooperate;

7. developing access to information as a means to enhance the capacities of the concerned parties; and

8. strengthening judicial institutions and their capacity to deal with various issues beyond legal ones.

Though the idea of cooperating in the field of governance and democratization was brought up, it was felt that this might not be acceptable to ASEAN as it falls within the domestic sphere.

ASEAN’s lack of capacity to address domestic and regional conflicts was highlighted as a major weakness. In East Timor, ASEAN fell short of what was expected from it, especially during the initial stage of the conflict. ASEAN was also absent in the resolution of the MNLF problem. The peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the MNLF was facilitated by Indonesia and the OIC and not by ASEAN as a group, although several member countries of the OIC are also members of ASEAN.

Some participants argued that even the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) does not have the capability to take on the task, such as in the case of the South China Sea disputes because of the lack of political will of the ARF participants and China’s strong objection to putting the issue in the ARF agenda. As in ASEAN, consensus-decision making gives every ARF participant some form of veto power over the forum’s agenda and decision making processes.

Though this may be the case, it was noted that it is not impossible for the ARF to explore other areas of active involvement in conflict prevention. It could consider working in any of the following areas:

1. exchange of ideas, information, and other resources with relevant actors/parties,

4. institutionalization of regular consultations among ASEAN, the ARF Chair, and the UN Secretary-General.

Another perceived weakness of ASEAN is its strong adherence to the non-interference principle. It was noted that ASEAN characterized events in Myanmar as domestic politics and hence, is covered by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that stipulates non-interference in the domestic affairs of member countries. While this is a universally recognized principle, it was noted that ASEAN appears to put a higher premium to it than other regional groupings. To enhance its role in conflict prevention and peace-building, it was suggested that ASEAN should also look into areas that constitute humanitarian actions that do not constitute political interference.

ASEAN also needs to muster the political will in order to play a larger role in regional peace-building activities. It should be more active in on-going peace-building activities, such as the present negotiations on a Regional Code of Conduct on the South China Sea between ASEAN and China, as well as its role in Cambodia, East Timor, and Myanmar.

Noting that the conventional concepts of security may be military oriented, it was noted that military and non-military approaches to regional peace and stability are not mutually exclusive. In the case of ASEAN, there is a need to seek/explore alternative means of being involved in the domestic affairs of a country without deviating from the “ASEAN Way”.

In spite of the success of both the UN and ASEAN in dealing with trouble spots in the region, there are gaps that need to be addressed as part of peace-building efforts. Some of the gaps are:

5.2 to provide human rights training, particularly to the police and the military,

However, one basic issue that must be resolved is under which circumstances ASEAN would benefit from UN involvement (be it Member States or the Secretary-General) to prevent conflict in the region. Establishment of institutional arrangements with the principal UN organs dealing with conflict prevention is imperative. In addition, there should be shared values by parties involved in cooperative ventures, while an agreement on processes and modalities of engagement is also crucial.

Though best practices have been identified and discussed, one primary challenge is the choice of the appropriate model of conflict prevention and peace-building. Once this is determined, the next question has to do with the appropriate solutions and the kind of capacity that those who would carry them out possess. There is also a need to identify the conditions under which UN assistance would be called in. One important step neglected by most countries is the post-conflict situation that actually marks the divide between peace and war since post-conflict actions require peace-building to avert the recurrence of war.

Within ASEAN itself, the debate on intervention and non-interference needs to be resolved. ASEAN should review its minimalist approach and the extent to which this has contributed to ASEAN’s performance record. One peace-building agenda item that was suggested is humanitarian action short of interference. Here, the UN can cooperate with ASEAN on an agenda already set by ASEAN members themselves, like the ASEAN Vision 2020, a section of which is the establishment of a community of caring societies in Southeast Asia. If successfully carried out, this vision is likely to make a very valuable contribution towards conflict prevention and the attainment of a durable peace in the region.

Moreover, peace initiatives could be within and outside the UN framework and both formal and informal mechanisms should be explored. ASEAN and the UN should enhance their cooperation both at the procedural and substantive levels and should identify the next steps to be taken in their agenda for cooperation.

Strengthening ASEAN-UN Cooperation: The Next Steps

Part of the processes of conflict prevention and peace-building is the role/s to be played by the international community where the various experiences in Southeast Asia demonstrated the crucial role of ASEAN and the UN.

There is recognition among the participants that the end of conflict prevention and peace-building is empowering the people and the community. They would have to acquire the capacity to facilitate conflict resolution and peace-building in their own communities. However, there are short term and long term recommendations that ASEAN and the UN must take into consideration to enable them to move the process forward in Southeast Asia:

Short-Term Policy Recommendations

1. Explore the possibility of expanding UN-ASEAN cooperation in the form of a dialogue. Consider the suggested areas of cooperation such as: identification of situations where peace-building is required; the definition of the political objectives; development of integrated operational responses; joint monitoring results of peace-building; and assistance programs. In addition, both should consider the basic principles for cooperation by looking at shared values regarding processes and modalities of engagement.

2. Sustain the dialogue mechanism by holding similar seminars in the future focusing on gaps such as socio-economic aspects, information exchange, and best practices identified in peace-building process.

3. ASEAN representatives participate in the working level meeting between the UN and regional organizations in May 2002.

4. ASEAN as a collective grouping submits its comments on the Secretary-General’s report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict that was published in 2001.

5. Examine the merit or feasibility of the UN’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and for ASEAN to also explore the possibility of applying for an observer status in the UN General Assembly.

6. Look at the possibility of a UN and ASEAN joint information campaign in Southeast Asia that will develop a “culture of peace” where people prioritize peaceful settlement of disputes.

7. The UN and ASEAN set up a mechanism whose agenda would be humanitarian action, a vision shared by both the UN and ASEAN especially in the latter’s Vision 2020 on the section about creating a community of caring societies.

8. Organizers of the South China Sea Workshops establish links with concerned UN agencies. In addition, track 1 and track 2 mechanisms/networks in ASEAN explore environmental and maritime issues on the South China Sea that could bring disputants together.

9. Either by bilateral or multilateral means, states explore the possibility of drafting an “Incident at Sea Agreement” to reduce tensions in the South China Sea area.

10. Establish sustained people-to-people contact as a separate form of engagement in the process since greater interaction and convergence among ASEAN civil society groups can have an impact on the policies of ASEAN. Here, the ASEAN ISIS’ ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA) initiative can serve as the vehicle.

Long-Term Policy Recommendations

1. On the part of ASEAN, if it wants to take on a pro-active role in the region, it has to forge a consensus regarding its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. ASEAN could reflect on the principle of constructive engagement in the context of proactive engagement.

2. The UN in partnership with ASEAN could also consider establishing a Center for Peacekeeping in ASEAN. To do this, the UN would have to solicit assistance from and establish a close working relationship with its department of peace-keeping operations.

3. The UN and ASEAN should explore the idea of institutionalizing regular consultations among ASEAN, the ARF Chair, and UN Secretary General.

Given the above, the task lies not just on the individual states and the international community. Equally important is the role of civil society that would be either the direct beneficiary or casualty of conflict prevention and peace-building endeavors.

ISDS declared its intention to publish the papers and proceedings of the Manila Seminar in the form of a book that will be distributed to the various ASEAN member states and UN agencies whose launch will be timed for the next ASEAN-UN seminar in this series, planned to be held in Singapore in 2003.

[1] The 41 participants constituted of 3 from Brunei Darussalam, 1 from Cambodia, 3 from Indonesia, 2 from Lao PDR, 2 from Malaysia, 1 from Myanmar, 6 from the Philippines, 1 from Singapore, 2 from Thailand, 2 from Vietnam, 1 from the ASEAN Secretariat, 6 from the UNDP, 5 from the UNDPA, 3 from the DFA, 3 from ISDS, while the two observers were from PARAGON and from the International Peace Academy.