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3rd ASEAN/UN Conference on Conflict
Prevention, Conflict Resolution & Peace building in Southeast Asia:
ASEAN/UN Experiences in Anticipating & Mediating Conflicts
18-19 February 2003 @ Traders Hotel Singapore
Introduction
The United Nations
Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Singapore (MFA), the ASEAN Secretariat, and the
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), jointly organised
the Singapore Conference on “Conflict Prevention, Conflict
Resolution & Peace building in Southeast Asia on 18-19 February
2003. It is the third in a series of collaborative activities
between the UNDPA and the UNDP on the one hand, and the ASEAN
Secretariat and ASEAN Institutes on the other. The first conference
was co-organised with the Institute of Security and International
Studies at Chulalongkorn University (ISIS Thailand) in January 2001
on “Democratization and Conflict Management/Prevention in Southeast
Asia in the 21st Century”. The second conference was
organised in Manila on 19-22 February 2002 by the Philippines
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies.
Seminar Objectives
The Singapore Conference sought to
discuss the following objectives’ as spelt out in the Opening Speech
by Acting Foreign Minister, HE Lee Yock Suan:
-
identifying the actors who would be responsible for
initiating and implementing preventive action to forestall
conflict;
-
designing an effective preventive strategy to
address trigger points for conflict;
-
developing an accountability system for funding and
investments in conflict prevention;
-
and addressing the tension between interference and
intervention.
The Singapore Conference paper
presenters and discussants were drawn mainly
from ASEAN experts and UNDPA
officials as well as UNDP resident representatives. The final list
of 68 participants and observers included those from the 10 ASEAN
member countries: China, Japan the ASEAN Secretariat, UNDP, UNDPA,
the Singapore MFA, Ministry of Defence and IDSS. There were also
media representatives. The participants were invited in their
personal capacity in accordance with the usual practice of track two
meetings, and the media representatives observed the conference
proceedings under Chatham House rules.
In general, the
Singapore Conference witnessed an in-depth and lively discussion of
the various experiences in conflict prevention, conflict resolution,
and peace-building in the ASEAN region. It was able to identify
both the successful and failed experiences of the region in these
areas needing the attention of stakeholders and assistance of
partners, as well as making both short-term and long-term policy
recommendations for the consideration of ASEAN and the UN. One key
issue discussed at the conference was the dilemma between respecting
national sovereignty and the responsibility to protect. One
solution could be to build the capacity and institutions in
negotiating skills & conflict management.
Issues Discussed and Lessons Learned
There were eight paper
presentations and one lunchtime key note speech by Dr Surin Pitsuwan
focusing on regional mechanism for conflict prevention, 5 case
studies in conflict prevention and peace-building in the region
(Cambodia, East Timor, Aceh, S. Philippines, Bougainville), best
practices and lessons learned from these regional experiences
(including the experience of the Henry Dunant Centre in helping to
resolve the Aceh conflict and how they can be helpful in building
regional capacity for dealing with future crises, and how to enhance
ASEAN-UN cooperation in these tasks in the 21st century.
As shown below, through these presentations and the ensuing
discussions, the four objectives of the seminar were achieved.
While ASEAN was not
intended as a mechanism for conflict prevention and peace-building,
its record indicates that its norms, principles, and processes, know
collectively as the “ASEAN Way” have contributed to peace and
stability in a region fraught with bilateral tensions and domestic
threats to peace and stability, 35 years after ASEAN’s establishmebt.
For over 30 years, while ASEAN did not directly address or resolve
the causes of these tensions, it has succeeded in avoiding their
eruption into open conflict, ASEAN members are still addressing
their won domestic threats to peace and stability. However, to
remain relevant, it needs to re-examine itself and to learn best
practices from other regional organization.
Lessons Learned from the Region’s Experiences
The case studies
provided important lessons that can be useful in increasing the
region’s capacity for conflict prevention and peace-building in the
future as well as in enhancing ASEAN-UN cooperation in undertaking
these tasks in this century.
Who is Responsible?
On the first issue
of identifying the actors who would be responsible for initiating
and implementing preventive actions, the conference has identified
various institutional mechanisms that are already in place, and that
are also well-placed to deal with issues of conflict prevention,
conflict resolution and peacebuilding. These are:
1.
Regional
Institutions:
ARF, ASEAN High Council & Troika
2.
UN
Institutions:
UNTAET in EAST Timor, UN Special Envoy in Myanmar
3.
NGOs:
Henri Dunant Centre in Aceh
The conference recognized that
recourse to these actors to address conflicts, however,
remains captive to the willingness
of opposing adversaries to appeal to them for preventive action.
What are Effective Preventive
Strategies?
On the second broad
issue of identifying effective preventive strategies, the
conference drew lessons from a number of recent episodes:
The UN experience in Cambodia
1.
importance of developing the
government’s capacity for transparency and predictability;
2.
importance of external parties
maintaining perception of neutrality, and trustworthiness,
especially as regards facilitating electoral process and brokering
disputes.
The ASEAN experience
1.
the conference discussed the role of
multilateral treaties like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation or
the ASEAN declaration on the South China Sea in establishing
framework for conflict management;
2.
the conference discussed the place of
musyawarah and muafakat in building consensus in decision-making;
3.
also highlighted was the role played by
the form of interaction within ASEAN in facilitating conflict
management: informality, consensus, communication, sensitivity,
restrain and respect.
4.
the need for ASEAN to progress further
from process into structure, namely to move from issuing numerous
declaration to concrete actions and results.
The Aceh experience
1.
the role of NGOs like the HDC in
facilitating conflict resolution.
On the third issue of
funding for conflict resolution and conflict management efforts, the
conference highlighted instances where external funding proved
crucial in facilitating conflict resolution efforts. One important
instance was the Japanese funding during the Timor crisis, which
helped operations to bring the Timor predicament to a peaceful
outcome. While the conference did not address the question of
accountability directly, participants did attempt to highlight
concerns that may require further attention. Prospects for funding
could be directed to address these matters. They include:
1.
level of political stability in states;
prospect of failed states, regime collapse;
2.
economic crises that could precipitate
conflict;
3.
absence of civil society;
4.
lack of religious harmony;
5.
role of neighbouring states in
instigating or mitigating conflict;
6.
sustainability of a state’s
development.
On the fourth issue of the
tension between interference & intervention, the conference
recognized the tension between interference and interference.
Efforts were made to address the nuances and differences in the
definition of the tow terms. One (interference) deals with
violations of rule of law and state sovereignty while the other
(intervention) seemed to connote more positive references couched in
justifiable humanitarian considerations.
The Aceh case study
indicated that utilizing NGOs was a useful compromise in mediating
between two adversarial parties. The use of NGOs as mediators
allayed the main concerns of the parties that were in conflict:
trust and credibility. For reconciliation to occur and for the
peace to be maintained, both parties had to trust the third party to
mediate justly.
In conclusion, the
conference suggested that non-traditional security challenges like
environmental degradation open up new avenues for cooperation
between ASEAN and the UN. Facing these challenges together by
exploiting the opportunities to establish new frameworks, new
institutions, and perhaps stronger mechanisms, both organizations
would be better equipped to preserve stability in the region.
Recommendation
In his keynote lunchtime speech,
Dr Surin Pitsuwan, former Foreign Minister of Thailand, drawing
lessons from his personal involvement in helping to resolve the
conflicts in Aceh, East Timor and Cambodia, stressed the following:
a)
Do not expect all ASEAN members to get
involved in the efforts to resolve the conflict;
b)
Whilst abiding by the principle of
consensus, be flexible-those willing to help
should be allowed to proceed,
whilst others should stay out; this is called the
Flexible Consensus Principle;
c)
To implement proposed solutions,
funding is vital; Japan was willing to pay the
UN bills in East Timor;
d)
Involve the UN as it provides the
required legitimacy;
e)
There is a need for assertive and
active leadership which is willing to take risks;
f)
Leave room for improvisation and remain
flexible;
g)
Those who assisted went into action as
concerned neighbours who had previously
cooperated and thus built up
trust;
h)
Regional members need strong members
which can act well and cooperate during
crises.
Views of Asean
Secretariat-General
Asean Secretary-General, Mr Ong
Keng Yong stated that the key element is institution building. For
example, referring to the recent, Cambodia-Thai incidents in
February 2002, he felt that Asean & the UN should focus more on
institution building and to rely less on personalities. They should
also enhance the contribution of NGOs to helping resolve bilateral
conflicts and help maintain law and order. Mr Ong also stressed the
role of technology is the fast spread of information or
misinformation. Hence countries should recognize the impact,
negative or positive, of media technology on bilateral relations.
Former Asean
Secretary-General, Mr Rodolfo Severino noted that Asean does not
have agreed standards for behaviours on matters pertaining elections
and other political processes. In contrast, the EU, OSCE, OAS,
African Union and Commonwealth have established agreed the standards
in their charters, which they invoked on occasion as needed. In the
absence of agreed standards, any advocacy or other intervention by
political agendas. ASEAN members do not trust one another enough or
trust ASEAN enough, to allow their domestic affairs to be subjected
to the scrutiny of their peers, he argued. However, the course of
political charge in ASEAN may move towards convergence on more
liberal regimes, he hoped. Mr Severino suggested that work on
common standards of behaviour could begin in Tract II forums, with
the help on the UN.
Follow-up to Manila
Recommendation
The conference
discussed the issue of follow-up to the previous conference held in
February 2002 in Manila. One pre-condition is the meeting of minds
on premises, principles and processes. Premises would be antecedent
agreements on certain proposition, such as whether or not Asean
feels the need to invite outside help. Shared principles and common
values between the UN and ASEAN will promote unity of purpose and
mutual confidence. Processes give form to the modalities of
engagement. The meeting of minds between ASEAN and UN is a
continuos process, not a once-for-all event. The conference
highlighted the following obstacles in implementing various
recommendations:
a)
No
ownership – even
if Asean Senior officials meeting take note of the recommendations,
no one pushed any specific steps at the official level. The ASEAN
Secretariat has only a minor role in political matters. ASEAN
organizations are not keen to add on to their already heavy agendas.
b)
Identify situations and issues where
ASEAN-UN security cooperation could be enhanced. ASEAN is inclined
to let domestic and bilateral conflicts be addressed by national
governments and domestic actors. The South China Sea dispute is one
traditional security threat where ASEAN has taken cognisance of its
overlapping claims and its regional dimension. The Manila
conference proposal for UN and ASEAN to jointly undertake workshops
on UNCLOS and its implications for the South China Sea has not been
acted upon. China might be adverse to UN involvement in the South
China Sea disputes.
c)
On a possible ASEAN-UN dialogue
relation, the conference noted that the UNSG during this visit to
Jakarta in year 2000, had expressed his hope that UN-ASEAN
cooperation in the field of development would be extended to the
field of peace and security.
d)
On UN participation in the ARF, this is
not practical in view of the ARF criteria adopted in July 1999 that
all new participants have to be sovereign states. The UN could
apply to be an observer at ARF meetings.
e)
On Observers status for ASEAN at
UNGA, the conference noted that there were certain practical
difficulties.
f)
A Center
for Peacekeeping in ASEAN
– Despite UN-readiness to push for assistance from UNDPKD, there has
been no progress on this issue. The ARF Concept Paper includes this
idea.
g)
Continue holding
the ASEAN-UN Conferences on Conflict Prevention,
Conflict Resolution and Peace-building
The conference agreed that such
conferences were useful forums for networking,
consciousness-raising, exchange of information, etc. Two ASEAN
countries were interested to host the next Conference in 2004. UNDP
and other specialized UN agencies could be tapped innovatively to
provide their unique insighes and experiences, just as UNDP had
provided useful information at the Singapore conference.
In general, the Conference noted
the mismatch between public expectations and institutional purposed,
capacity and political will. At a time when international terrorism
is posing challenges to good governance efforts by regional
governments, it is crucial to sustain collective efforts towards
forging consensus and shared UN-ASEAN visions of peace and
developments and security.
Recap of Manila Conference
Recommendations
For easy reference, these are the
recommendations of the Manila Conference:
Short-term Policy
Recommendations
1.
Explore possibility of expanding the
UN-ASEAN Cooperation in the form of a Dialogue.
2.
Sustain the dialogue mechanism by
holding similar conferences in future on various topics.
3.
Asean representatives take part in the
working level meeting between UN and Regional organizations
4.
Asean should submit collective comments
on UNSG Reports eg. Prevention of Armed Conflict – 2001.
5.
UN Participation in ARF & Asean
observers status at UNGA.
6.
ASEAN-UN cooperation to jointly develop
a Culture of Peace
7.
UN-ASEAN joint cooperation to develop
an agenda for Humanitarian Action
8.
South China Sea Workshops to be linked
with relevant UN agencies
9.
Draft on Incident-at-Sea Agreement to
reduce tensions in South China Sea
10.
Establish linkages between ASEAN
citizens eg. Asean ISIS’ Asean Peoples’ Assembly
Long-term Policy
Recommendations
1.
Asean could reflect on the principle of
constructive engagement in the
Context of pro-active engagement;
2.
Establish a UN-ASEAN Centre for
Peace-keeping within Asean;
3.
UN-ASEAN discuss idea of regular
consultations between Asean,
Chair and UN SG.
Conclusion
The Singapore Conference was
notable for :
a)
high level participation from ASEAN, UN
and UNDP
b)
strong UNDP presence and contributions
c)
lively discussion and exchange of ideas
d)
agreement to continue this series of
conferences in an Asean country in
2004; as a dialogue mechanism
between Asean, UN, UNDP on a Track II
level
e)
Follow-up actions:
i)
IDSS will publish a book including all
the Revised Papers and Commentaries
ii)
UNDP and IDSS hope to initiate setting
up a Centre for
Negotiations and Conflict
Management
IDSS
March 2003
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